The questions is if… this is the main topic about
Antonio Conte’s attempt to implement his 3-5-2 with the Azzurri. At
international level, the last try to successfully deploy a three-man back line
has put on place by Louis Van Gaal. The fact the Dutch coach opted to stick to
it also with Manchester United, raised some questions. Conte will face a similar attempt: export his
3-5-2 from the club to the National Team. Italy experimented a sort of familiarity with the system. Cesare
Prandelli utilized it against Spain at Euro 2012.
When former Juventus' manager took the job three
summers ago, he was linked with the 4-2-4 formation he successfully employed with
Bari and Siena during his previous stints. Interviewed about it, he candidly admitted:
“There’s been too much talk on this particular way of playing. In actuality it’s a 4-4-2. I know of course novelty makes sometimes a great topic of discussion. If instead of saying ‘4-2-4′ I had said ‘4-4-2′ from the very beginning, we wouldn’t be discussing this ‘innovation’. Maybe all it is is just a normal idea of play. It is a normal 4-4-2. I think in England most teams that are winning are applying this type of module, which enables you to cover the playing field in the best possible way I think.” But as the season went on, Conte changed his way, switching to a 4-3-3 before stuck to a classic 3-5-2, a defensively pattern utilized above all by teams with relegation fears. Switching between formations can be wrong if the players aren't suited to do it. Initially, Juventus showed the team ability to switch between 3-5-2 and 4-3-3. But Conte didn't turn to a rough 3-5-2 and his approach was active and not reactive. He employed a three-men midfield to protect the deep-lying playmaker Andrea Pirlo and to leave him free of hard defensive duties. Covering Pirlo was one of the main issues for the opponents. Using a second striker dropping on Pirlo in the defensive phase resulted on to have the striker tired soon; using a midfielder often has seen this player to be late on the coverage. In both cases Pirlo became free as the game went on. And he also goes forward to help the team in the final third of the pitch. If teams try to cover Pirlo with an attacking midfielder, Giorgio Chiellini or Leonardo Bonucci was the men able of playing out of the back and joining the midfield to start attacks for Juventus. The diamond built around the three-men back line and Pirlo is from where Juventus started his ball circulation. In Champions League, the 3-5-2 faced some troubles. Against more gifted or equal level teams, the 3-5-2 showed its weakness. Against Jupp Heynkes’ Bayern, Conte’s 3-5-2 is often forced to become a defensive-oriented 5-3-2, leaving the middle of the field in control of the Germans. So, in effect, Juventus had a flat back five with an outnumbered midfield and two isolated forwards up front. The squad played too low and, with much field to cover, counter-attacking play was unable to work. Conte showed that all the people thinking you can't win with a 3-5-2 formation was wrong. This was true at Serie A level. If it can work at international level too, it remains to be seen.
“There’s been too much talk on this particular way of playing. In actuality it’s a 4-4-2. I know of course novelty makes sometimes a great topic of discussion. If instead of saying ‘4-2-4′ I had said ‘4-4-2′ from the very beginning, we wouldn’t be discussing this ‘innovation’. Maybe all it is is just a normal idea of play. It is a normal 4-4-2. I think in England most teams that are winning are applying this type of module, which enables you to cover the playing field in the best possible way I think.” But as the season went on, Conte changed his way, switching to a 4-3-3 before stuck to a classic 3-5-2, a defensively pattern utilized above all by teams with relegation fears. Switching between formations can be wrong if the players aren't suited to do it. Initially, Juventus showed the team ability to switch between 3-5-2 and 4-3-3. But Conte didn't turn to a rough 3-5-2 and his approach was active and not reactive. He employed a three-men midfield to protect the deep-lying playmaker Andrea Pirlo and to leave him free of hard defensive duties. Covering Pirlo was one of the main issues for the opponents. Using a second striker dropping on Pirlo in the defensive phase resulted on to have the striker tired soon; using a midfielder often has seen this player to be late on the coverage. In both cases Pirlo became free as the game went on. And he also goes forward to help the team in the final third of the pitch. If teams try to cover Pirlo with an attacking midfielder, Giorgio Chiellini or Leonardo Bonucci was the men able of playing out of the back and joining the midfield to start attacks for Juventus. The diamond built around the three-men back line and Pirlo is from where Juventus started his ball circulation. In Champions League, the 3-5-2 faced some troubles. Against more gifted or equal level teams, the 3-5-2 showed its weakness. Against Jupp Heynkes’ Bayern, Conte’s 3-5-2 is often forced to become a defensive-oriented 5-3-2, leaving the middle of the field in control of the Germans. So, in effect, Juventus had a flat back five with an outnumbered midfield and two isolated forwards up front. The squad played too low and, with much field to cover, counter-attacking play was unable to work. Conte showed that all the people thinking you can't win with a 3-5-2 formation was wrong. This was true at Serie A level. If it can work at international level too, it remains to be seen.
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento